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Telecom Security: Countering Untrusted Equipment Abroad

This act aims to enhance the security of telecommunications networks in the US and among its allies by restricting the use of equipment from companies linked to China. It mandates reporting on such equipment and supports the development of secure technologies. For citizens, this means potentially more secure internet and phone connections, protecting their data from unauthorized access.
Key points
The US government will monitor whether allies use telecommunications equipment from companies deemed untrusted, such as Huawei or ZTE.
US embassies must audit and remove untrusted telecommunications equipment to protect diplomatic data.
Companies listed on US stock exchanges will have to disclose if they use untrusted telecommunications equipment, increasing transparency for investors and consumers.
The act supports the development and deployment of secure telecommunications technologies globally, potentially improving service quality and security for everyone.
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Status:
Expired
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Additional Information
Print number: 117_HR_8520
Sponsor: Rep. Wild, Susan [D-PA-7]
Process start date: 2022-07-26
System Note: Lustra is free, publicly auditable civic infrastructure, with full source code available on GitHub. You are reading sterilized legislative data, processed by our radical neutrality engine to strip political spin and retain factual mechanics. We process only official government data. Original documents remain the authoritative source, always verify them if you can.
Summarized by: gemini-2.5-flash-preview-05-20
Source data: api.congress.gov
AI work logs for this document launch

OFFICIAL LEGAL TITLE

Countering Untrusted Telecommunications Abroad Act

FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

What is the official ID of this bill?

The official print number for this legislation is 117_HR_8520.

Which chamber initiated this legislation?

This legislation was initiated in the House of Representatives.

When did the legislative process begin?

The process officially started on 2022-07-26.

What are the main provisions?

Key points include:

  • The US government will monitor whether allies use telecommunications equipment from companies deemed untrusted, such as Huawei or ZTE.
  • US embassies must audit and remove untrusted telecommunications equipment to protect diplomatic data.
  • Companies listed on US stock exchanges will have to disclose if they use untrusted telecommunications equipment, increasing transparency for investors and consumers.
  • The act supports the development and deployment of secure telecommunications technologies globally, potentially improving service quality and security for everyone.
What is the specific legal status?

The current status is Expired.

Where can I read the full text of this legislation?

The full official text is available at: View full text

Who is the primary sponsor?

The primary sponsor is Rep. Wild, Susan [D-PA-7].

What is the latest detailed status?

The latest detailed status is: Pursuant to section 2 of H. Res. 1361, and the motion offered by Mr. Hoyer, the following bills passed under suspension of the rules: H.R. 1433, as amended; H.R. 4009, as amended; H.R. 4358, as amended; H.R. 6265; H.R. 6846, as amended; H.R. 7240, as amended; H.R. 7338, as amended; H.R. 8453, as amended; H.R. 8503, as amended; and H.R. 8520, as amended; and the following resolution was agreed to under suspension of the rules: H. Res. 558, as amended. (consideration: CR H7984-7992; text: CR H7990-7991)

Is this summary verified?

Yes. This content was analyzed by AI and verified by the Lustra Judge System on 2025-12-28.

What is the impact of this bill?

We don't know, that is up to you to decide. Summarizing raw data with AI is fundamentally different from predicting socio-economic outcomes. As of 2026, we believe impact assessment strictly requires a human in the loop to verify and judge.

CATEGORIES

Security Economy